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I. INTRODUCTION
International environmental law has been marked by two contradictory
trends. On the one hand, states and the international community have
become aware of the urgent need to protect the environment; however, at
the same time, they have been reluctant to enter into international
agreements laying down binding obligations, their specific content, and
extent.
Despite this tension, and in light of the emerging environmental
concerns, any kind of agreements need to be concluded, at least to sooth
civil society's pressure. Alongside this process, states started adopting
certain types of conduct under the belief that such conduct was necessary in
light of general principles. Thereby, "customary international law, general
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principles of law, and normative instruments have advanced a kind of a
common law of the environment."'
International practice shows that states have now accepted a general
principle of responsibility for environmental harm, but there are many
uncertainties as to the exact content. Moreover, in the literature many
references will be found about customary obligations and different regimes
of responsibility, the combination of which adds more confusion to the
subject. The purpose of this article, then, is to show that when trying to
assess the current status of international environmental law, due regard shall
be paid to the specific content and extent of the obligation, for they will
determine the regime of responsibility to be applied.
This article will further argue that the basic and foremost obligation of
states vis a vis other states in, the realm of international environmental law,
is not to cause damage to the territory of other states as such obligation has
attained customary status. Furthermore, the nature of this obligation is to
guarantee a result, and therefore, the only regime compatible with its terms
is that of strict responsibility. Finally, this article will contend that strict
responsibility is the only system that may have a sound bearing on actual
and future conducts of states towards respect of the environment.
II. DIFFERENT REGIMES OF RESPONSIBILITY: THEIR APPLICATION IN
LIGHT OF THE SPECIFIC NATURE
The regime of international responsibility in general, and in the realm
of international environmental law in particular, is based upon three
different grounds.2 The first one is responsibility based on fault. For that
purpose, to incur international responsibility a state must have failed to
exercise due diligence in the fulfillment of an international obligation.3 The
I. ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 99 (2004).
2. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY
(Oxford, part I) (1983).
3. In support of this proposition see M. Shaw, who opines that in the way that current
international law stands at present, responsibility for fault is the only applicable regime, for strict
liability has not been accepted as a general principle by international law. Leading cases are
inconclusive and treaty practice is variable: MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 853-54 (6th ed.
2008); Gunther Handl, State Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private
Persons, 74 Am. J. INT'L L. 525, 535 (1980) [hereinafter State Liability], albeit he endorses the
application of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities of transnational concern. State
Liability, supra note 3, at 550. However, in a prior work, Professor Handl seemed persuaded of the
existence of strict liability for any field of activity: "material damage... would seem to suffice in itself
as a basis for a successful direct international claim against the polluting state." Giinther Handl,
Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational Pollution, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 75-76
(1975) [hereinafter Territorial Sovereignty]. The only requisite would be the existence of material
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second one is strict responsibility. The mere breach of an obligation,
regardless of the state's efforts towards fulfillment of the obligation, entails
its responsibility.4 A third scheme is that pertaining to liability without a
wrongful act. In this case, liability arises from lawful activities, as long as
there is a causal link between them and the damage caused. This scheme
relies on the idea that the application of modem technology to industrial
activities creates a special situation, not adequately addressed by the
traditional scheme of state responsibility. Some authors support this
rationale with respect only to ultra hazardous activities,5 whilst others
6
extend it to any activity that may cause damage to the environment.
However, it has to be noted that the type of regime of responsibility
cannot be consecrated in the abstract, irespective of the nature and extent of
the obligation concerned. Otherwise, the very nature of the obligation
would be changed, as this article will exemplify in the following
paragraphs.
damage, whilst moral damage would only be a basis for action if there was a specific governing rule of
international law. Territorial Sovereignty, supra note 3, at 59.
4. Authors that adhere to this concept argue that states are under an absolute obligation to
prevent pollution and are thus liable for its effects irrespective of fault. In support of this position, see L.
F. E. Goldie, A General View of International Environmental Law--A Survey of Capabilities, Trends
and Limits, 1973 Hague Colloque pp. 26, 73-85 [hereinafter General View]; PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN
BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVtRONMENT 182 (2d ed. 2002); Professor Sands appears to
support this rule in respect of ultra hazardous activities, although his position for others activities seems
until undefined: "for general industrial and other activities which are not ultra-hazardous or dangerous,
it is less easy to argue for a standard of care based upon strict or absolute liability." PHILIPPE SANDS,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 882 (2d ed. 2003).
5. W. Jenks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law, 117(1) R.C.A.D.I.
99-200 (1966); John M. Kelson, State Responsibility and the Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 13 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 197, 197 (1972); State Liability, supra note 3, at 550, but only in respect of abnormally
dangerous activities oftransnational concern.
6. Jan Schneider, State Responsibility for Environmental Protection and Preservation:
Ecological Unities and Fragmented World Public Order, 2 Yale Studies in World Public Order 32, 33
(1975-1976); Allen L. Springer, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLuTION 133-34 (Westport Quorum
Books 1983) L. F. E. Goldie, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 306 (1970) [hereinafter International Principles]; this author extends the standard
of strict liability for other conducts than hazardous activities, however for him this standard is not
applicable to all kind of activities:
[E]ven though this writer welcomes the advent of strict and absolute liability...
he does not look forward to the elimination of the less stringent doctrines ....
The strictness of the liability to be imposed should depend upon the type of
activity causing the harm, the type of activity harmed or through which an
individual is harmed, and the juxtaposition of the operator and the injured.
International Principles, supra note 6, at 317. He then foresees different scenarios to explain the
different types of responsibility to be applied. See International Principles, supra note 6, at 317-18.
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Let's assume that the main obligation, in international environmental
law, was restricted only to prevent damage to the environment. By
definition, such obligation would impose upon states a duty to appropriately
assess whether an activity may cause harm and if that were the case, to
adopt measures to minimize the risk. However, under this type of
obligation a state would not be responsible if, having taken all those
appropriate measures, any damage occurred. This type of obligation clearly
matches with the regime of responsibility for fault.
On the contrary, if the regime of strict liability were applied to such
obligations, states would be obliged to absolutely prevent all kinds of
damages. Should damage occur, it would imply that the state failed to some
extent to prevent it. Damages would be totally irrelevant whether the state
had taken some reasonable measures, or all necessary measures to avoid
such harm. The state simply would have failed to prevent damages, and
therefore, would be responsible. This regime would turn the state into an
absolute guarantor of the environment, being tantamount to alleging that the
state is under an obligation not to cause damage to other states'
environment. This scheme would denaturalize the content and extent of the
obligation to prevent environmental harm.
What would the scenario be provide that the concerned obligation was
not to cause damage to other states' environment? If a due diligence
standard was applied to that obligation, then once the damage occurred, the
state's conduct should be analyzed first. If the state had been diligent in
adopting measures to avoid harm, then, it would not be responsible for such
damage. This finding leads to undermining the extent of the obligation, for
it no longer would be one of result, but rather an obligation to prevent
damage. It is beyond doubt, that this regime is incompatible with the
obligation of respecting other states' environment. Consequently, the
appropriate standard for the obligation not to cause damage would be that
of strict responsibility.
This conclusion is further endorsed by analyzing this obligation in
light of the third regime: liability without wrongful act. Under the
obligation not to cause damage to other states' environment, the regime of
strict responsibility would imply that the mere verification of damage
would trigger the responsibility of the state. The same result would be
obtained under the liability regime. The only difference would be that in
the first case, the verification of damage would imply the existence of an
internationally wrongful act of a state; whereas, the latter discards this
concept.7 As professor Nanda could not have stated more clearly, the limits
7. It is argued that the regime of strict responsibility should be preferred owing to the stigma
that a wrongful act inflicts on a State, which has a deterrent effect. See Daniel Magraw, Transboundary
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between responsibility and liability are blurred since transboundary harm
results in a breach of the states' sic utere tuo obligation.",
8
The duplication of the results demonstrates the redundancy of both
regimes. Therefore, the obligation not to cause damage to other states'
environment coupled with the application of the strict responsibility regime,
the regime of international liability for injurious consequences arising out
of acts not prohibited by international law, misses its raison d'etre.
This article will suggest a new solution because the regime of
international liability has been the object of many criticisms, and
particularly accused of being vitiated by two basic errors. The first
criticism is that of confusing the lawfulness of certain activities with the
lawfulness of the state conduct. In this vein, those are two different
concepts, and indeed, it is possible that, even a lawful activity is
accompanied by an international wrongful act of the state, for not
preventing certain damaging effects or not taking appropriate control
measures. The second error is equating the distinction between
responsibility for a wrongful act and liability for lawful activities with the
distinction between responsibility for fault and responsibility without fault
(strict responsibility). In this connection, it must be clarified that
responsibility without fault is a different concept from liability for a lawful
activity; while the former requires the breach of an obligation on the state,
the latter gives rise to compensation (responsibility) for the mere
verification of damage. 9
Therefore, as we have already demonstrated, and as Professor Pisillo-
Mazzeschi has previously discerned, the problem of environmental
protection must not be addressed from the framework of state
responsibility, but from the scope of the primary rules that determine the
expected conduct from the state.'0 What is left to be analyzed is the specific
content of the substantive rule at stake.
Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of International Liability, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 305,
318 (1986).
8. VED P. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 156 (1995).
9. For more details about the critics, see Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, Forms of International
Responsibility for Environmental Harm, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
HARM, 15, 26-27 (Franceso Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., Graham & Trotman 1991); BROWNLIE,
supra note 2, at 50.
10. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 9, at 23.
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III. THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW OBLIGATIONS: THE OBLIGATION NOT TO CAUSE DAMAGE
TO THE ENVIRONMENT
This article will now turn to address what is the specific content of the
core obligation of international environmental law. In this vein, this article
will argue that the prohibition against causing damage to other states' has
attained customary status. To that end, this article will review the teachings
of the most prominent scholars in the field, analyze the contents of treaty
obligations to discern what has been the conduct of states, review case law
to envisage the role of courts in the advancement of this rule and finally
forge a conclusion in relation to state practice and opiniojuris in support of
this assertion.
A. The Teachings of Most Prominent Scholars
Some authors consider that the general rule does not entail the
prohibition of pollution, but only an obligation of preventing, reducing and
controlling pollution, and environmental harm, based on a due diligence
standard. By no means would such rule impose an obligation not to cause
damage. Consequently, a state would be responsibly only to the extent that
it failed to adopt all possible means to prevent the damage." Professor
Okowa, who adheres to this position, attempts to render this obligation a
little more objective by advancing some procedural obligations against
which the state conduct will be assessed; should any of them be omitted,
11. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 181-82; Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 9, at 24. In terms of
Tomuschat: "Neither may, on one hand, a 'source state' unrestrictedly pursue activities that cause
transboundary harm, nor may, on the other, an affected state claim absolute protection against any
negative consequence of such activity." Christian Tomuschat, International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law: The Work of the International
Law Commission, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 37, 40 (Franceso
Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., Graham & Trotman 1991); BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 4, at 112.
Even if we cited these authors in support of the strict liability position, parts of their teachings wander,
causing some confusion. In this vein, they assert that two propositions enjoy significant support in state
practice: i) the duty to prevent, reduce and control pollution and ii) a duty to co-operate in mitigating
environmental damage. However, when explaining the content of the Rio Declaration, they argue that
"the more convincing view is that the Rio Declaration is merely restating existing law," being therefore
implicitly the idea that state must ensure that their activities will not cause damage to the environment of
other states. BIRNiE & BOYLE, supra note 4, at 104-105. When analyzing principles 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration and 2 of the Rio Declaration, these authors state: "what these formulations
imply is a general obligation on the part of states to act with due diligence." Int'l Law Comm'n [ILC],
Report of the ILC to the GAOR, 718, U.N. Doc. A/55/10 (May-Aug. 2000). They also state, "[tireaty
formulations and the work of the ILC overwhelmingly favour the due diligence interpretation of states'
primary environmental obligations." BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 4, at 113.
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then the state in question, would be precluded to sustain that it has taken all
practicable measures to prevent environmental damage.12
Another group of scholars contends that the basic duty upon states is
not to act as to injure the rights of other states, but combines this obligation
with the application of a due diligence standard of care. 13 The intermediate
position gives rise to the confusion of the extent of the obligation that has
already been espoused in the previous chapter.
According to a yet another group of authors, "states have . . . the
responsibility not to cause transboundary environmental damage."' 4  This
rule is a customary norm containing an obligation of result, and its breach
gives rise to strict liability.15 In this view, Professor Ved Nanda resorts to
12. Phoebe N. Okowa, Procedural Obligations in International Environmental Agreements,
67 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 275, 280 (1996). As procedural obligations, Professor Okowa enumerates:
notification, consultation, and environmental impact assessment albeit she sustains that even if desirable,
these obligations have not reached customary status. Id. at 335-36. These obligations are laid down by
the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, in arts. 6, 7, 8 and 9,
U.N. GAOR, 56"' Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 399, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (August 10, 2001), which are supposed
to codify international law. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Third report on the Legal Regime for the Allocation
of Loss in Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, para. 38-39, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/566 (Mar. 7, 2006) (prepared by Pemnaraju Sreenivasa Rao) [hereinafter Third Report].
13. SHAW, supra note 3, at 851, citing doctrine expressed by Judson Harmon, Attorney-
General of the United States in 1895, 21 Op. Att'y. Gen. 274, 283 (1895); NANDA, supra note 8, at 155-
56. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 1, at 105. For the application of responsibility for fault, see Kiss &
SHELTON, supra note 1, at 854; E. Jimenez De Arrchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a
Century, 159 R.C.A.D.I. p. 272 (1978): "principle 21 of the Stockholm declaration ... lend some
apparent support for transnational pollution damage in all cases, regardless of the precautions which
State has taken." However, when dealing with the applicable standard of care, this author acknowledges
strict responsibility only for ultra-hazardous activities and clarifies that: "this type of responsibility only
results from conventional law [and] has no basis in customary law or general principles and, since it
deals with exceptions rather than general rules, cannot be extended to fields not covered by the specific
instruments." De Archaga, supra note 13, at 273. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, International Responsibility
and Liability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1010, 1014
(Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee and Ellen Hey eds., Oxford University Press 2008).
14. SANDS, supra note 4, at 322; Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423,485-93 (1973).
15. Ulrich Beyerlin, Different types of Norms in International Environmental Law, Policies
Principles, and Rules, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 425, 439
(Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee and Ellen Hey eds., Oxford University Press 2008); Brian Smith,
STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 112-113 (1999); Magraw, supra note 7, at
319; Constance O'Keefe, Transboundary Pollution and the Strict Liability Issue: The Work of the
International Law Commission on the Topic of International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising Out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law, 18 DEN. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 145, 162 (1989).
See Preliminary Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/334 and Add.l and Add.2 (1980), reprinted in
[1980] 2(1) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 247, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/334 and Add.l and Add.2 (prepared by
Robert. Q. Quentin-Baxter).
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the principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which means that every
state must use its own territory "in such a manner as not to injure that of
another."' 6 Thus, in his opinion there might be some confusion with respect
to the content of the obligation of prevention, "since any activity capable of
inflicting transboundary harm might be considered per se illegal under the
principle of sic utere [tuo].' ' 7
B. The Obligation Laid Down in International Instrument
Several General Assembly Resolutions tackle environmental concerns,
however, some of them blatantly condemn the act of harming the
environment of other states and impose responsibility on states who cause
such harm. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1629 (XVI)
1961, declares that "fundamental principles of international law impose a
responsibility on all states concerning actions which might have harmful
biological consequences.'
' 8
The Resolution on Development and Environment, stresses the right of
states to exploit their natural resources, inasmuch as such exploitation takes
place "in such a manner as to avoid producing harmful effects on other
countries."'19 In a manner much more conclusive, the Resolution on Co-
operation Between States in the Field of the Environment emphasizes that
"[s]tates must not produce significant harmful effects in zones situated
outside their national jurisdiction. 20
From the wording cited, an obligation on states to refrain from causing
any significant damage to other states' environments, clearly emerge. This
trend was finally enshrined in Principle twenty one of the Stockholm
Declaration of 1972, which stipulates that states have the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
Professor Handl argues that the preparatory works of the declaration
show that there was a strong opposition to the idea that Principle twenty one
established a regime of strict liability.2' Such criticism disregards,
according to rules of interpretation, that the ordinary meaning of the terms
prevails over preparatory works, unless the question was obscure or led to
16. NANDA, supra note 8, at 2.
17. Id. at 156.
18. G.A. Res. 1629 (XVI), prmbl, U.N. Doc. A/1629(XVI) (Oct. 27, 1961).
19. G.A. Res. 2849 (XXVI), 4(a), U.N. Doc. A/2849(XXVI) (Dec. 20, 1971).
20. G.A. Res. 2995 (XXVII), 1, U.N. Doc A/2995(XXVII) (Dec. 15, 1972).
21. State Liability, supra note 3, at 536.
[Vol. 16:1
2009] Mackielo
absurd results.22 To the contrary, neither the terms of Principle twenty one
are obscure, nor does the application of a standard of strict responsibility
lead to an absurd result.
Moreover, it ought to be highlighted that when enacting Resolution
2996 (XXVII) adopting the Stockholm declaration, many states regarded
the wording of Principle twenty one as reflecting customary international
law.23 Furthermore, and still resorting to customary rules of interpretation,
the obligation is endorsed by subsequent state practice 24 when voting in
favor of other resolutions as well as when drafting treaties.
Indeed, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
25
reiterates the obligation in exactly the same terms. A similar duty is
envisaged in the 1978 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the
Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of
Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States.26 It was also reiterated
in Principle two of the Rio Declaration 1992.27
It is argued that all these instruments reflect principles rather than
rules, and therefore lack normative power. Professor Sands dwells on the
22. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332
[hereinafter Law of Treaties].
23. One hundred and twelve States voted for this resolution with none in opposition. In
particular, see Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14
and Corr.1 at 1420-1464, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr.l. The
United States expressed that Principle 21 in no way diminished existing international responsibility for
damage to other states or areas beyond, national jurisdiction, but it reaffirmed existing rules. Id. In turn,
Australian delegate manifested that ". . . it represented the first comprehensive international political
consensus on environmental issues and, although it was not legally binding, it has been the subject of
intensive negotiations and should thus be generally acceptable." UN Doc. A/C.2/.SR 1468 cited in
Territorial Sovereignty, supra note 3, at 67 n.100. Australia, in its oral pleadings in the Nuclear tests
case, further stated that: "[t]he specific function of the Stockholm resolution and declarations is that
they reflect what the community regards as an acceptable standard of conduct in these matters .... "
Oral Arguments on the Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, Nuclear Tests
(Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. Oral Arguments 185 (June 22, 1973).
24. Law of Treaties, supra note 22, at art. 3 l(3)(b).
25. Adopted by G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), prmbl, U.N. Doc. A/3281(XIXX) (Dec. 12, 1974).
26. Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in
the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States,
[1983] 2(1) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 197, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/L.353 [hereinafter Draft Principles of
Conduct]. Principle three of such instrument requires states to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the natural systems located within other states or in areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Id. at art. 3.
27. The Rio Declaration was adopted by consensus of 175 States. Conference on Environment
and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, annex I
principle 2, A/CONF.151/26 (June 14, 1992).
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distinction between principles and rules, concluding that both have legal
consequences, and its difference is verified by the kind of mandate that each
of them provide.28 Indeed, both rules and principles point to particular
decisions about legal obligations, but they differ in the character of the
direction they give. Rules are applicable in an all or nothing fashion. A
principle states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not
necessitate a particular decision. 9
The value of these statements, regardless of their form, should not be
diminished.3 ° Indeed,
principles can be understood as norms that are first and foremost
designed to give guidance to their addressees for future conduct
in rule making processes as well as to shape the interpretation
and application of rules already in existence. Thus, they aim at
influencing states' decision making, which otherwise remains
open to choice, as well as their interpretation of rules;
31
all the more when they are included in binding instruments, such as the in
the Preamble of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change.32
The coherency and consistency of these resolutions and instruments,
coupled with the votes they have gathered in their adoption, as well as
states' declarations when adopting them, provide clear evidence as to the
existence of opiniojuris in support of the obligation not to cause damage.33
Even if the instruments mentioned above were considered as the mere
restatement of a principle, such principle would still have normative value
as a source of international law, since it would constitute a general principle
of law recognized by civilized nations in terms of Art. 38(d) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 34 In turn, it has also been stated
28. See SANDS, supra note 4, at 233.
29. RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24 (1977).
30. Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48(4) INT'L
& COMP L.Q. 901, 902 (1999).
31. Beyerlin, supra note 15, at 437.
32. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, May 9, 1992
FCCC/INFORMAIJ84, lists "principles" intended to guide the parties "[i]n their actions to achieve the
objective of the Convention and to implement its provisions."
33. Resolutions or declarations passed by international organizations or intergovernmental
conferences can be considered as amounting to a clear expression of opiniojuris as acknowleged by the
I.C.J. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4,44 (Feb. 20).
34. U.N. Charter art. 38, 1 1(d). For a thorough analysis of all the domestic systems that
incorporate such a principle, see Report of the UN. Secretariat: Survey of State Practice Relevant to
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that the constant and uniform conduct of states, when ratifying or adhering
to treaties that amount to state practice, can crystallize a customary rule of
international law.35
As already explained there exists much confusion in respect to the
specific content of the rule and the standard of care to be applied. The
existence of an obligation of result corresponds with a regime of strict
liability. Therefore, it is necessary to first analyze the substantive
obligations in states' practice to proceed later with the standard of care
established by them.
There are many treaties that specifically set forth the obligations not to
cause environmental harm, such as: Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 1963 ;36 United
Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention for the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972;37 Treaty for
Amazonian Co-operation, 1978;38 Convention for the Protection of the
Natural Resources and the Environment of the South Pacific Region
Noumea Convention (1986); 39 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or
any Other Hostile use of Environmental Modification Techniques;
40
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International
Law, [1985] 2(1) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 78, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/384 [hereinafter Survey of State
Practice]. A more recent study has been conducted in European Union (hereinafter EU) Member States
as well as in five Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter OECD)
countries (the USA, Canada, Australia, Japan and Switzerland) by Christopher Clarke, Update
Comparative Legal Study on Environmental Liability 8 (2001) (unpublished legal study), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/legalstudy.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2009). This
proposition has not been pacific, though. Professors Birnie and Boyle devote some paragraphs to rebut
it. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 4, at 187-88.
35. Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 41-42 (Feb. 20); Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, IN 92-97 (June 27).
36. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under
Water art. 1, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, directly prohibits the weapon test explosions if it causes
radioactive debris in other states' territories.
37. United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention for the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage art. 6.3, Mar. 9, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 reads:
"[e]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes not to take any deliberate measures which might
damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural Heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 situated on
the territory of other States Parties to this Convention."
38. Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation art. IV, July 3, 1978, 1202 U.N.T.S. 71.
39. Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South
Pacific Region art. 4(6), Nov. 24, 1986, 26 I.L.M 382, establishes that "[e]ach party shall ensure that
activities within its jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of its national jurisdiction."
40. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1976.
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
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ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, (2002);4' and the
Convention on Biological Diversity, in its Article 3 reproduces, verbatim,
the text of Principle twenty one of the Stockholm Declaration.42
There are other treaties that merely contain an obligation to prevent
environmental harm. They normally state the obligation to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage, however,
they normally are accompanied by the words "best endeavours" or "shall
take all appropriate measures. 43
Techniques art. 1, Dec. 10, 1076, 1108 U.N.T.S. 152. Article one states: "[e]ach State Party to this
Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or
injury to any other State Party."
41. ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution art 3, June 10, 2002,
http://www.aseansec.org/pdf/agr haze.pdf (last visited, Sept 26, 2009).
42. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 3, Dec. 29, 1993, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143. The
Convention on Biological Diversity has 191 parties. See Convention on Biological Diversity,
www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). Stockholm Declaration principle 21,
available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/
Default.asp?DocumentlD=97&ArticlelD=1503 (last visited Oct. 22,2009).
43. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil art. VII, May
12, 1954, 327 U.N.T.S. 4; Geneva Convention on the High Seas art. 25, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
Even if it is drafted in terms of a preventive obligation, some states construe such article imposes an
obligation of result, as New Zealand did in its Request for an Examination of the situation. See Request
for Examination of the Situation, Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. Oral Proceedings 1, 10 (Sept.
12). Mr. Keith states: "[t]he Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 1958, a treaty which is of course a
codifying treaty, puts the general obligation not to cause damage into more specific terms." Other
treaties: Convention Concerning Fishing in the Waters of the Danube art. 7, Jan. 29, 1958, 339 U.N.T.S.
58; African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources art. II, Sept. 15, 1968,
1001 U.N.T.S. 4; Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land Based Sources art. 1,
June 4, 1974, 1546 U.N.T.S. 120; Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from
Ships and Aircraft art. 1, Feb. 15, 1972, 932 U.N.T.S.5; Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter art. , Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 138; Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution art. 2, Nov. 13, 1979,
http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/full%20text/1979.CLRTAP.e.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2009);
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals art. 4, June 23, 1979,
http://www.cms.int/pdf/convtxt/cms__convtxt-english.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2009); Convention on
the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats art. 2, Sept. 19, 1979, Europ. T.S. No. 104.
This Convention, however, has a sui generis wording, for it states in article 2:
The Contracting Parties shall take requisite measures to maintain the population
of wild flora and fauna at, or adapt it to, a level which corresponds in particular to
ecological, scientific and cultural requirements, while taking account of economic
and recreational requirements and the needs of sub-species, varieties or forms at
risk locally.
By employing the words "requisite measures" it conveys the idea that there are certain strict,
objective standards to abide by; Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal
Area of the South-East Pacific art. 5, Nov. 12, 1981, httpJ/sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/
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The existence of these treaties, however, does not impair the existence
of a customary rule of international law prohibiting states to cause damage
to other states' environments, for many reasons. First, from a time-frame
perspective, the obligation to prevent damage comes before that of
prohibiting damage. In this vein, failure to prevent, if it leads to harm,
would trigger the second obligation, which only comes into play after
damage has occurred. Professor Sands acknowledges the differences
between these obligations and points out that the obligation not to cause
damage "arise[s] from the application of respect for the principle of
sovereignty, whereas the preventive principle seeks to minimize
environmental damage as an objective in itself."" Therefore, the
obligations are independent, and the fact that treaties devote part of their
text to the former, does not curtail the existence of the latter. Secondly, the
paragraphs about prevention are followed by specific actions to be followed
by states: inter alia, risk assessment, monitoring, and providing
information. Thus treaty obligations can be read as guidelines for states to
accomplish their prior duty of prevention. Finally, the treaty-making
process is complex, and states might be unwilling to indiscriminately
assume responsibility for any harm they might cause in an express manner.
As developed earlier, issues of responsibility and the standard of care
to be applied are inherently connected with the substantive or primary
obligation. Thus, this article will review treaties from the perspective of
provisions of responsibility to complete the framework related to main
environmental obligations.
There are some treaties that impose strict liability on states while
others only provide for a scheme of fault. A third group adopts a regime of
strict liability incumbent upon private parties (namely operators) and in
some cases with the residual liability of the state. A fourth category,
remains silent on the issue, and a final bundle of bilateral, special
agreements expressly regulates responsibility issues for certain activities or
particular situations.
1. Strict Responsibility Upon States
Some treaties directly impose responsibility on states, by the mere
verification of damage. The Convention on International Liability for
marine.environment.coastal.south.east.pacific.1981.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2009); United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 192,194, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; Vienna Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer art. 2(b), Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293; Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context art. 2.1, Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S.
309; Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes arts
2.1 and 2.2, Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269.
44. SANDS, supra note 4, at 246.
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Damage Caused by Space Objects, 1972 provides for absolute liability for
damage caused by space objects on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in
flight (article 1I). 4 5 Responsibility is imposed on states by the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.46 Also, the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay (1982),
establishes strict responsibility for conduct carried out within the area.47
2. Schemes of Responsibility for Fault
All the treaties dealing with the obligation to prevent environmental
damage set forth a regime of responsibility for fault, since states would be
deemed responsible, only to the extent that they have failed to meet the
procedural obligations contained in the treaty at stake, or if they have not
exercised due diligence.
However, the provisions on responsibility contained in the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea deserve special attention.
Article 235 in its first paragraph enshrines that states "shall be liable in
accordance with international law. ' 48 It should be noted, first of all, that the
term liability is related to the obligation to make compensation irrespective
of the breach of any international law obligation. Thus, a literal
interpretation may lead the reader in that direction. Secondly and more
important, the provision does not purport a specific regime, but rather
defers the subject to general rules of international law. As this article will
explore later, it is our contention that these kinds of provisions presuppose
the existence, under international law, of a general regime of responsibility,
particularly, that of strict responsibility. Such conclusion is bolstered by the
third paragraph of Article 235 that stipulates ". . . states shall cooperate in
the implementation of existing international law . . . relating to
45. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects arts 3, Mar.
29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 188. However, Article III provides for a scheme of responsibility for fault for
damage caused elsewhere or to persons or property on board a space object.
46. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VII, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S 206.
See also G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), 5, U.N. Doe. A/1962(XVIII) (Dec. 13, 1963); G.A. Res. 47/68, 9,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992).
47. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 139, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
3. It declares: "States Parties shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities in the Area, whether
carried out by States Parties, or state enterprises or natural or juridical persons... shall be carried out in
conformity with this Part."
48. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 47, at art. 235.
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responsibility and liability for the assessment of and compensation for
damage .. 9
3. Civil Liability Regimes
These treaties do not directly deal with the responsibility of states but
of private persons. They exceptionally have a bearing on states if the
operator was not capable of compensating all the damages caused.
Nonetheless, they are included in this section for they convey the idea that
states are aware of the existence of a rule prohibiting the infliction of
damages, but are unwilling to assume responsibility for its breach in
treaties. In this law-making process they opt to place the blame on third
parties; however, as analyzed in the following chapter, when faced with
damage, states ascertain the existence of this rule and invoke the
responsibility of the state where the damaging activity has taken place,
regardless and independently of any responsibility incumbent upon the
operator.
Examples of these treaties include: The Convention on the Liability of
Operators of Nuclear Ships, (1962);5o Paris Convention on third party
liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, (1960);51 Brussels Supplementary
Convention (1963);52 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage, (1963); 53 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage (1997 Vienna Convention);54 International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969); 55 the
International Convention on the establishment of an International Fund for
49. Id.
50. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962,
www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/.../en/TRE000585.doc (last visited Oct. 22, 2009). States
Parties: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Iceland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Signing List
of the Convention on Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/
RecordDetails?id=TRE-000585&index=treaties (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
51. Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 28, 1964,
956 U.N.T.S. 264.
52. Brussels Supplementary Convention, July 29, 1960, 1041 U.N.T.S. 358.
53. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S.
266.
54. Conference to Adopt a Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage and to Adopt a Convention on Supplementary Funding, Sept. 12, 1997, 36 ILM 1454,
1466.
55. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage art. 111, Nov. 29,
1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 4.
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Oil Pollution Damage (197 1);56 Protocol establishing a Supplementary
Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, (in force since 2005);17 International
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with
the carriage of Hazarodus and Noxious Substances by Sea (1996);58
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution
Damage (2001);59 Basel Convention on the control of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their disposal (1989);60 Protocol to the
Basel Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting
from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their disposal
(1999);61 Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused
by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary
Waters (Kiev Protocol, 2003);62 Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment (1993).63
In line with this regime, on April 21, 2004, the Directive on
Environmental Liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of
environmental damage was adopted. 64 It applies to environmental damage
56. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, http://www.imo.org/Conventions/
mainframe.asp?topic id=256&doc_id=661 (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
57. The 2003 Protocol to the International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage,
May 16, 2003, http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp? topic id=256&doc id=661 (last
visited Oct. 22, 2009).
58. International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea art. 7, Oct. 1, 1996,
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/imo.carriage.by.sea.liability.compensation.damage. connected.to.
hazardous.and.noxious.substances.convention.1996/portrait.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
59. International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage art. 3, Mar.
23, 2001, http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/ cm66/ 6693/ 6693.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2009).
60. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and
Their Disposal art. 12, Mar. 22, 1989, http://www.basel.int/text/con-e-rev.pdf (last visited Sept. 27,
2009).
61. Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Dec. 10, 1999, http://www.basel.int/meetings/
cop/cop5/docs/prot-e.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
62. Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention of Environment
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, May 21, 2003, httpJ/unece.org/env/eia/
documents/legaltexts/protocolenglish.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
63. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment art. 6, June 21, 1993, Europ. T.S. 150.
64. Council Directive 2004/35/CE, prmbl 2, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 8. The directive was
amended by the Directive on the management of waste from extractive industries, Council Directive
Mackielo
as well as to damage to protected species and natural habitats, caused by a
list of certain hazardous activities, such as waste management, discharges to
water, manufacture, use, storage, processing, filling and release of
dangerous substances or preparations, amidst others. It particularly
excludes from its scope of regulation, nuclear activities as well as
environmental "damage... caused by pollution of a diffuse character...
,66 Therefore, part of the damage remains unregulated.
The Directive mainly deals with internal pollution, however, in respect
to transboundary harm it sets forth, that if a Member State identifies
damages within its borders, caused by another, it may seek to recover the
costs it has incurred "in accordance with this Directive".67 This part implies
that the state may seek compensation from the operator; however, in no part
is it stated that this scheme supersedes the general regime of state
responsibility, and therefore, it would still be compatible with the idea that
states are under a duty not to cause harm.
4. Treaties Silent With Respect to the Applicable Regime on Responsibility
There are a category of treaties which contain a reference to liability
without further classification as to the substantive or procedural rules of
liability. For instance, the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, London, 1972,
establishes that in Article X: "[i]n accordance with the principles of
international law regarding State responsibility for damage to the
environment of other States, or to any other area of the environment, caused
by dumping of wastes ... parties undertake to develop procedures for the
assessment of liability and the settlement of disputes. .. "
Treaties containing similar provisions are: 1978 Kuwait Regional
Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment
from Pollution; 1976 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean
Sea against Pollution; 1981 Convention for Cooperation in the Protection
and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and
Central African Region; 1981 Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific; 1982 Regional
Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
Environment (Jeddah Convention); 1983 Convention for the Protection and
Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region
2006/21/EC, prmbl 25, art. 15, 2006 O.J. (L 102). It extended the scope of protection of Directive
2004/35/CE to include waste from mining and other extractive industries.
65. Council Directive 2004/35/CE at art. 3 and annex III.
66. Id. at art. 4(5).
67. Id. at art. 15.
20091
ILSA Journal of Int ' & Comparative Law
(Cartagena Convention); 1985 Convention for the Protection, Management
and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern
African Region; 1986 Convention for the Protection of the Natural
Resources and the Environment of the South Pacific Region; 1990 Protocol
for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-
based Sources; 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area; 1992 Convention for the Protection of
the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic; 1992 Convention on
the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution; 1992 Convention on the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents; 1992 Convention on the
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes; 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity;68 2001 Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.69
Such deference to rules in international law permit an inference that
states implicitly acknowledge the existence of certain obligations, although
they opt not to state it expressly. The reasons for not including such rules
in treaties are manifold. It has been argued that there are competing,
political, military, economic, industry, and other public interests, that
influence the process of conclusions in treaties. The reasons that have been
suggested are as follows:
a) That the material scope of Conventions are too broad;70
b) The spatial scope might be too broad;71
68. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 3, Dec. 29, 1993, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143. Article 14.2
states: "[t]he Conference of the Parties shall examine, on the basis of studies to be carried out, the issue
of liability and redress, including restoration and compensation, for damage to biological diversity,
except where such liability is a purely internal matter." Similarly, see Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
to the Convention on Biological Diversity art. 27, Jan. 29, 2000, http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cartagena-
protocol-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). The protocol has 156 parties. See Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity Signing List,
http://www.cbd.intlbiosafety/signinglist.shtm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
69. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001,
http://chm.pops.int/Portals/0/Repository/conventiontext/UNEP-POPS-COP-CONVTEXT-
FULL. English.PDF (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). The Convention has been in force since 17 May 2004
and has 146 Parties. See Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants Signing List,
http://chm.pops.int/Countries/StatusofRatification/tabid/252/Aanguage/en-US/Default.aspx (last visited
Sept. 27, 2009).
70. Ren6 Lefeber, General Developments: International Civil Liability Compensation, 11 Y.
B. INT'L ENVTL L. 139, 151 (2000). Professor Lefeber, explains in relation to the 1993 Lugano
Convention, that it has been criticized as being too general and going beyond the situation obtaining in
some states in respect of environmental damage as such, particular, the concept of hazardous activities
was perceived as excessively broad and the relevant definitions vague, especially with regard to
biodiversity damage. Denmark, Ireland, Germany and the United Kingdom made it clear that the
approach of the 1993 Lugano Convention to liability differed from their own national law.
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c) The scope of application of the various regimes has been
considered to be less favorable than domestic law;
72
d) Incompatibility between some proposed regimes and others
already assumed,73 amidst others.
No negative inference should be made from the omission of
prohibitive rules. Indeed, it is suggested that with many governments
participating, with varied interests, the treaty making process is confusing
and the results are difficult to explain.75
Thus, if liability rules are not expressly laid down in treaties but are
somehow relied on by reference to general international law, the content of
general international law has to be discerned. Thus, it is fruitful to review
states' practice out of general treaties. It will become apparent that, when
71. For instance, when revising the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
it was purported that States should contribute to a fund that would help in repairing damages caused
within a State territory; non-nuclear-power-generating States were reluctant to enter into it since such
agreement was perceived as a financial burden with no tangible benefits. Id. at 149.
72. This has been argued as the reason for United States, Canada, Japan and Russia to be
reluctant to become parties to Nuclear Liabilities Convention, as the victims would obtain a better relief
under national laws. Robin R. Churchill, Facilitating (Transnational) Civil Liability Litigation for
Environmental Damage by Means of Treaties: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, 12 Y.B. INT'L.
ENvTL L. 3, 10 (2001).
73. For instance, the Czech Republic and Slovakia in responding to a questionnaire on the
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail
and Inland Navigation Vessels observed that they were striving to be admitted into the EU and their
priority was harmonization of its legal regulations with the laws of the EU. Since the EU was preparing
new regulations concerning transport of dangerous goods, the possibility of becoming a party to the
Convention would have to await consideration until the Czech Republic was able to adopt the new
regulations in the context of the harmonization process. Note by the Secretariat, Report of the
Secretariat on Replies to the Questionnaire related to the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage
Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels, add. 2,
delivered to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.15/2001/17/Add.2 (Feb. 23,
2001); Note by the Secretariat, Report of the Secretariat on Replies to the Questionnaire related to the
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail
and Inland Navigation Vessels, add. 6, delivered to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc.
TRANS/WP.15/2001/Add.6 (Aug. 22, 2001). Both addendums are cited in: International Law
Commission [ILC], Survey of Liability Regimes Relevant to the Topic of International Liability for
Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 209 n.366, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/543 (June 24, 2004) (prepared by the Secretariat) [hereinafter Survey of Liability
Regimes].
74. For a thorough analysis of the reasons that may prevent States from entering into treaties,
see Survey of Liability Regimes, supra note 73, IN 195-214.
75. Louis Henkin, The Politics of Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 17, 21-22 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., Lynne Reinner Publishers
1998).
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engaged in certain activities that may lead to some sort of damage, states
enter into treaties to govern the issue and to obtain guarantees of
indemnification.
5. Bilateral Treaties
There are a bundle of bilateral treaties that establish responsibility in
cases of injuries.76 One of the most relevant is the agreement of 29
December 1949 between Norway and the USSR concerning the regime of
the Norwegian-Soviet frontier and procedure for settlement of frontier
disputes and incidents. Accordingly, parties may not exploit the mineral
deposits near their frontiers in a way that would harm their respective
territories. Additionally, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
entered into a treaty with Hungary,77 which establishes that "the contracting
parties shall ensure that the frontier waters are kept in proper order . . .
[w]here one contracting party occasions material damage to the other...
compensation for such damage shall be paid by the Party responsible
therefor."
Similarly, the agreement of 29 April 1959 concerning the regulation of
Lake Inari between the Government of the USSR, the Government of
Finland and the Government of Norway, established the payment of a lump
sum for any loss or damage that might be caused to land, waters, structures
or other property owing to the Kaitakoski hydroelectric power station and
dam.
Finally, Article 51 of the Treaty of 19 November 1973 between
Argentina and Uruguay concerning, Uruguay River, lays down the principle
that "each party shall be liable to the other for detriment suffered as a
consequence of pollution caused by their operations . . . ." This Treaty has
been the subject of an international dispute. 8
76. Agreement on the Use of Italian Ports by the N.S. Savannah art. VIII, Nov. 23, 1964, 1965
U.N.T.S. 138; Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Relating to Public Liability for Damage
Caused by the N.S. Savannah note 1, June 18, 1964, 1965 U.N.T.S. 218; Agreement on Public Liability
for Damage Caused by the N.S. Savannah art. I, Feb. 6, 1963, 1964 U.N.T.S 115; Nuclear Law Bulletin
No. 6, Agreements of Germany: Nuclear Ships, 36, http://www.nea.fr/htmllaw/nlb/NLB-06-EN.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2009); Agreement Concerning the Effects on the Territory of the Federal Republic
of Germany of Construction and Operation of the Salzburg Airport art. 4, Dec. 19, 1967, 1974 U.N.T.S.
92, establishes a safety zone within Germany, that can be injured by the result of the operation of the
Austrian airport. This means that, as Austrian activity may cause an injury within Germany such
activity would be prohibited, unless consented by Germany, and that was the reason for signing the
treaty. For a more detailed explanation, see Survey of State Practice, supra note 34, at In 45-46.
77. Treaty Concerning the Regime of the Soviet-Polish State Frontier and Co-operation and
Mutual Assistance in Frontier Matters art. 4(5)(6)(7), Feb. 15, 1961, 1962 U.N.T.S. 233.
78. See infra Section Il1(c), Pulp Mills.
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These treaties in the aggregate create rules that influence the behaviors
of state parties to them as well as of non-parties, and provide some evidence
to the existence of a rule not to cause damage to the environments of other
states.
C. The Obligation Not to Cause Damage in International Disputes
The 1872 Alabama case, between the United States and the United
Kingdom addressed state practice concerning international disputes. This
case showed that claims between states did not deal with state liability
arising out of failures to exercise due diligence,79 but rather strict liability,
except in relation to protections of aliens.
In the well-known Trail Smelter arbitration, the Tribunal noted that
"no state has the right to use or permit the use of territory in such a manner
as to cause injury ... to the territory of another." 80 Even for those who
discard the value of this case, arguing that it was resolved according to a
compromise whereby Canada had already acknowledge the existence of
responsibility, 81 it still constitutes an instance of practice, where a state
acknowledges its responsibility for damage caused by pollution. Indeed, it
represents what states perceive as acceptable solutions when faced with
environmental damage.
Later on, in the Corfu Channel, the Court acknowledged the general
obligation of every state "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for
acts contrary to the rights of other states. 82 This rule has been expanded by
analogy to include transboundary environmental dangers.8 3 As pointed out,
in this passage the court was making a general statement of law and policy,
not limited to the specific case. Thus, it can be considered a declaratory
general statement regarding the conduct of any state which might cause
extraterritorial injuries.84
Moreover, Albania itself acknowledged the existence of a rule
prohibiting her to cause damage to others, when her counsel stated "[i]f
Albania had been informed of the operation ... her responsibility would be
involved .... ,,85
79. Survey of State Practice, supra note 34, 398.
80. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1941). A thorough analysis of the case can be found at Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 1, at 102-04.
81. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 9, at 29.
82. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (April 9).
83. NANDA, supra note 8, at 78.
84. Survey of State Practice, supra note 34, at 1402.
85. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22.
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Authors who argue that this case is also irrelevant to show an
obligation of result, highlight the fact that the court only proscribes the
conduct of a state who knowingly allows its territory to be used for acts
contrary to the rights of others. In this knowledge, the authors pledge to
find the breach of a due diligence obligation, for an omissive conduct,
despite knowing the damage that might be caused.86 Such reasoning is
vitiated by the assumption that knowledge of an activity always entails a
positive obligation of the state to act. Indeed, these were the facts in the
Corfu Channel; if Albania knew the existence of the mines, then she had a
duty to inform that damage might be caused. Such obligation is not even a
due diligence one, but rather an obligation of result; Albania either
informed or she failed to do so and there were no steps towards complying
with an obligation to provide information.
The realm of environmental law is diverse. A state may have
knowledge of activities taking place within its territory and still may not
have a duty to act towards other states, unless for instance, there was risk of
causing harm. Therefore, knowledge by itself, neither differentiates a due
diligence obligation from an obligation of result, nor does its absence
constitutes an impediment to finding an obligation not to cause damage. A
state may or may not be aware of the activities that are conducted within its
territory; however, inasmuch as such activity results in damage to another,
it would breach its obligation of neimen laedere.
Moreover, almost every activity that may result in damage to the
territory is subject to state regulations. Therefore, states have virtual
knowledge of all the activities that take place within its territory, and they
could not seek to avoid responsibility under the excuse of lack of
knowledge. Indeed, it is the verification of harm, rather than knowledge,
that triggers the responsibility of the state and the consequent duty to
remedy the situation.
During the 1950's the United States conducted some nuclear tests,
which caused damaged to the Enewatak Atoll and Marshall Islands. To
settle the matter the United States made ex gratia payments for the damages
caused. However, the Government of Japan stated that the "United States
Government has the responsibility of compensating for economic losses
that may be caused by the establishment of a danger zone. 87  In its
response, the United States did not reject the imputation of responsibility; it
just circumscribed itself to deny the possibility of causing any
contamination or damage. However, the United States acknowledged that
86. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 9, at 29.
87. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 585-86 (1965).
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if there was any evidence of substantial economic losses, it would "give
consideration to the question of compensation.'
88
Other cases involving ex gratia payments without any
acknowledgement of responsibility are instances where states compensate
for environmental damage such as occurred in the Mura River case89 and
Juliana Ship90 . In those cases, there is an implicit assumption that other
states' environment should not be damaged, and if it were, those states
deserve to be compensated.
The Gut Dam case also consists of an instance of state practice
inasmuch as Canada had agreed to indemnify the United States for any
damage caused by the dam.91 In this vein, the value of such an agreement
cannot be underestimated, since as Professor Okowa indicates, states rarely
settle claims unless they are well founded in law.
92
In the Nuclear Tests cases, 93 Australia raised different arguments. Of
particular relevance is the violation of Australian sovereignty as the result
of radioactive fallout from the French tests.94 According to Australia, this
argument was "sufficiently comprehensive and strong to bear the whole
weight of the contention that the conduct by France of atmospheric tests
violates Australia's rights in international law." 95 Moreover, Australia was
asked by the President of the Court whether it took the view that every
transmission by natural causes of chemicals from one state into another
state's territory automatically created a legal cause of action in international
88. Id. at 587.
89. The river Mura, forming the International Boundary between Yugoslavia and Austria, was
extensively polluted by the sediments and mud which several Austrian hydroelectric facilities had
released. Yugoslavia claimed compensation for the economic loss incurred and for damage to fisheries.
State Liability, supra note 3, at 546. In 1959, the two States agreed on a settlement, pursuant to which
Austria paid monetary compensation. Id. Professor Handl, acknowledges that Austria did not pay
compensation on grounds of treaty obligations but rather, under the recognition of the existence of a rule
on strict liability. Id. at 547. He also acknowledges the incident of Juliana as another instance of state
practice. Id. However, in his opinion, this practice does not suffice. Id. at 546-47.
90. A Liberian oil tanker washed ashore and extensively damaged local fisheries in Niigata,
the west coast of Japanese island of Honshu. The Liberian Government paid compensation to the
fishermen for damage. State Liability, supra note 3, at 547.
91. Gut Dam Claims (Can. v U.S.), 8 ILM 114, 128 (Sept. 27, 1969).
92. Okowa, supra note 12, at 310. This author, refers explicitly to the United States practice,
which limits the power of the Executive Branch to settle claims to those that are meritorious: Id. at
n.124 citing to 10 USC §§ 2734, 2672, 2674 (1964).
93. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20).
94. Id. at 18-19.
95. Oral Arguments on the Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection,
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. Oral Arguments 162, 186 (May 1973).
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law without the need to establish anything more. Australia responded that
"where, as a result of a normal and natural user by one state of its territory,
a deposit occurs in the territory of another, the latter has no cause of
complaint unless it suffers more than nominal harm or damage. 96
This declaration shows that Australia, when claiming the protection of
its environment, was acting under the impression that a rule of international
law punished other states for causing harm to its territory.
France replied that in the absence of ascertained damage, attributable
to their nuclear tests, they did not violate any international rule of law.
Thus, France did not deny the existence of a rule mandating that no damage
shall be caused to the environment, but rather, denied the existence of
damage.
Judge de Castro in his dissent opinion stated:
If it is admitted as a general rule that there is a right to demand
prohibition of the emission by neighbouring properties of noxious
fumes, the consequences must be drawn, by an obvious analogy,
that the Applicant is entitled to ask the Court to uphold its claim
that France should put an end to the deposit of radio-active fall-
out on its territory.
In turn, Judge Ignacio Pinto, (in his separate opinion, stated that "each
state is free to act as it thinks fit within the limits of its sovereignty, and in
the event of genuine damage or injury ... it owes reparation to the State
having suffered that damage. 99
In the 954 Cosmos case, even if the matter was regulated by a treaty,100
it is noteworthy that Canada, when claiming compensation from Russia for
the damages caused, did not rely only on such treaty. Rather, Canada stated
that the standard of absolute liability for space activities in general, and for
96. Oral Arguments on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974
I.C.J. Oral Arguments 381, 525 (July).
97. Statement of the French Government, in a diplomatic Note dated 7 February 1973
addressed to the Government of Australia: "'infraction au droit pourrait... venire d'une violation par
la France d'une norme juridique international portent sur le seuil de pollution atomique qui ne devrait
pas etre d6passd" and that "clans le domaine 6cologique maritime et terrestre la contamination
radioactive dtait non significative." Id. at 29-30.
98. Nuclear Tests (Austl v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 372, 389 (Dec. 20) (dissenting opinion Judge de
Castro).
99. Nuclear Tests (Austl v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 128, 131 (Dec. 20) (seperate opinion of Judge
Ignacio-Pinto).




activities involving the use of nuclear energy in particular, is considered to
have become a general principle of international law.' °'
Following the Chernobyl tragedy, no state made a formal claim against
the USSR, although many reserved their rights to do so. 0 2 However, from
the absence of such claims, no inference can be made as to the inexistence
of an obligation not to cause damage, or its consequent right to states to
claim for reparation. Indeed, some states' declarations and behavior show
that they were very aware of their entitlement to sustain a claim, although
they declined to do so for other reasons. For instance, Sweden's declaration
provides a clear example of opinio juris regarding the statement of the law
at that time: "Insofar as customary international law is concerned,
principles exist which might be invoked to support a claim against the
USSR. The issues involved, however, are complex . . . [i]n present
circumstances, the Government has felt that priority should be given,... to
endeavors of another nature."'
0 3
In turn, other states, chose not to bring a claim, due to their condition
of pollutant states in other cases. Professor Sands uses the United Kingdom
to explain such contradictive interests of a State. The United Kingdom
faced claims for acid rain in Scandinavia, for contamination of the Irish Sea
for its MOX plant, and for alleged damage to Australian territory from the
nuclear tests carried out in the 1950s. 104
It is also relevant, on the wake of the Chernobyl case, to note the
conduct adopted by states when summoned by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to give their comments towards international
liability. Canada, Chile, Federal Republic of Germany, Thailand and
Guatemala supported the existence of responsibility for environmental
damage. Only Belgium and Spain rejected the existence of such a rule,
whilst Algeria, Bulgaria, Cameroon, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia,
Egypt, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland,
Switzerland, Turkey, USSR, United Kingdom, and the United States did not
support or oppose, but they had a pattern of bringing claims when suffering
damages, as well as for making ex gratia payments when causing them. 10 5
101. Canada: Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage Caused by
Soviet Cosmos 954, 18 I.L.M. 899, 907 22 (1978).
102. SANDS, supra note 4, at 887.
103. Correspondence with the Swedish Embassy in London, 10 December 1987, cited in
SANDS, supra note 4, at 888.
104. Id.
105. IAEA Docs. GOV/INF/550 (1988); Add.1 (1988); and Add.2 (1989).
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Finally, it should be noted that liability for nuclear accidents is a
matter already settled.10 6 Thus, in the absence of any claims in this case, the
only thing that shows is that states may refrain for espousing claims out of
political or comity reasons.
In the case concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Nauru
claimed that Australia had breached its obligation to administer the territory
of Nauru in such a way as not to bring about changes in the territory which
would cause irreparable damage to, or substantially prejudice, Nauru's legal
interests in that territory.'0 7 Due to phosphate mining, a substantial part of
the territory of Nauru was useless for any kind of agricultural activity.
Therefore, Nauru requested either the restoration (rehabilitation) of those
lands or compensation to provide for rehabilitation.00' This case shows the
existence of an absolute obligation not to cause harm, for a number of
reasons. In the first place, it was the General Assembly, through its
Resolution 2111 (XX) of 1965 which requested that immediate steps be
taken by the Administering Authority towards restoring the island of Nauru
for habitation by the Nauruan people as a sovereign nation.'09 Such
position was endorsed by other states, such as the USSR"0 and Liberia."'
Nauru asserted the existence of a duty of the administrator to preserve
the natural resources of a territory from depredation, and on the existence of
a principle of law which requires a state not to use its own territory in such
a way as to cause substantial harm to a successor of the land."' In this
vein, Nauru did not resort to a general obligation of prevention or taking
appropriate measures to prevent these lands to be rendered useless. To the
contrary, its claim presupposes an objective obligation, to not cause such
106. See practice referred to in Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Nuclear Liability: Status
and Prospects, at 8, IAEA Bulletin 4/1988 (1988).
107. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.) 1992 I.C.J. 240.
108. Id. at 15.
109. U.N. Res. 2111 (XX), at 64, U.N. Doc. A/21 11 (Dec. 21, 1965). A similar mandate was
laid out in U.N. Res. 2226 (XXI), 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/2226 (Dec. 20, 1966).
110. The representative of the Soviet Union urged Australia to undertake the restoration of the
mined out land, Report of the Trusteeship Council, 27 July 1966, General Assembly Official Records,
22nd Session, Supp. No. 4 (1966) p. 50.
111. Liberia proposed a draft to the Trusteeship Council, to call upon Australia to take
immediate steps to restoration and to declare that it was its responsibility to effect it. This draft
resolution was rejected; however, Nauru argued that such rejection did not imply a denial of the
restoration claim but a deferral to the parties to settle the issue in the most convenient way for both.
Memorial of the Republic of Nauru, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1990 I.C.J. 1,
607 (Mar. 20).
112. Memorial of the Republic of Nauru, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.),
1990 I.C.J. at 468.
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harm, and in case of the lands that were mined for obtaining phosphates,
adequate royalties should be paid to the owner of those lands to be invested
in the restoration of its environment.
Australia did not deny the existence of such a customary rule; on the
contrary it referred to the inter-temporal principle to explain that
international law as it stands today is not applicable to facts that took place
before 1967, 13 implying a tacit recognition of such customary rule today.
It further resorted to other defenses, mainly:
a) That restoration was not cost-effective, due to the high
costs and the ineffectiveness of those lands for agricultural
purposes even if rehabilitated;114
b) That Australia had duly conducted its obligations of result
emerging from its administrator's character, since it
promoted advancement of the inhabitants until
independence, having discretion in the choice of the means
to that end, 115 all the more when Nauru did not question the
mining per se; 16
c) That Nauru could have only claimed a duty to rehabilitate
those lands if the mining had prevented the well being of
the people of Nauru, which was not the case;
117
d) That had there been any breach of governing law, during its
administration, it would have entailed the responsibility of
the Trusteeship Council, owing to its supervisionary
function; 18
e) That there was an unconditional termination of the
Trusteeship, a package agreement, and a sum was
accordingly paid to Nauru.
1 19
113. Counter-Memorial of the Government of Australia, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru
(Nauru v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 2, 275 (Mar. 29).
114. Id.at 1 148-152.
115. Id.at 288.
116. Id.at1307.
117. Id. at 385, the welfare of the population is stated at 1 377-379, 382, 384. Australia
appears to raise this argument based on the law governing trusteeship in the 1950's and 1960's, but not
from the standpoint of today's rules on the environment. This can be inferred from the fact, that in the
first place, Australia relied on the intertemporal principle, to proceed later with alternative arguments.
She finally included a section named Australia Respected the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty
Absolutely, where she addresses the governing standards at the time of the administration, how it varied
through time and how Australia abided by these varying standards. See id. at IM 424-426.
118. Counter-Memorial of the Government of Australia, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, at
395-96, 401-402.
119. Id. at 335-36,371,373.
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This case was finally settled, on August 2003, by agreements between
the parties, whereby Australia had agreed to pay 107 million dollars to
Nauru, "to settle amicably the application brought by the Republic of
Nauru," made without prejudice to Australia's long-standing position that it
bore no responsibility for the rehabilitation. 20
In the Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with
Paragraph 63 of the Nuclear Tests Case 1974 in 1995, even if the Court
rejected New Zealand's request for re-examination of the 1974 decision and
consequently New Zeland's contention that France should cease with its
nuclear testing plan, the Court stated that its conclusion was without
prejudice to the obligations of states to respect and protect the
environment.
21
A review of the pleadings indicates that New Zealand's affirmation of
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration, and the ensuing obligation to ensure that the activities would
not cause damage to other environments reflected a 'well established
proposition of customary international law ' 122 and was not opposed by
France. 123  The existence of such rule was also endorsed by Judges
Weeramantry,124 Koroma, 25 and Ad Hoc Judge Palmer 26 in their dissentingopinions.
120. Id. at 511-12.
121. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 64 (Sept. 22). When France announced that
she would conduct a final series of eight nuclear weapon tests, in 1995, New Zealand filed a new
petition before the Court to have the conduct of France declared to be contained in the 1974 ruling
according to which France had to refrain from continuing with those tests given her unilateral promise
that no further testing would take place. The Court rejected New Zealand's claim on grounds that actual
French testing affected the marine environment, whereas the order of 1974 only dealt with atmospheric
pollution, and therefore the Court took the view that such controversy was beyond the scope of such
decision.
122. Request for an Examination of the Situation, Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. Oral
Proceedings 1, 11 (Sept. 12).
123. See, e.g., id. at 56-57. Statements of Mr. De Brichambaut: "la France n'a nullement la
pr~tention de nier que le droit de l'environnement ait connu des progr~s non nrgligeables, encore
qu'in~gaux, dans les quinze derni&es annes." "Elle est en particulier d'accord pour reconnaitre, en
liaison avec le principe 21 de la daclaration de Stockhom de 1972, repris au principe 2 de la daclaration
de Rio de 1992, 'existence d'un devoir gen&ral de prdvention des dommages i I'environnement."
124. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 317, 347 (Sept. 22) (dissenting opinion of Judge
Weeramantry).
125. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 363, 378 (Sept. 22) (dissenting opinion of Judge
Koroma).
126. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 381, 408 (Sept. 22) (dissenting opinion of Judge
Geoffrey Palmer).
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The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has seized its opportunity to
clearly consecrate the obligation not to cause damage in the Advisory
Opinion Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, when it
declared that "the existence of the general obligation of states to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of
other states or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of
international law relating to the environment.' ' 127 This was not a case and
there was no evidence in relation to state practice, however, it has been
cited in this work as an authoritative opinion of how law stands currently.
In the Gab ikovo-Nagymaros Project Case, when filing the application
before the Court, Hungary argued that the construction of the provisional
solution posed a serious danger to environmental resources and drinking
water. Also, it could threaten the vegetation and fauna that existed in that
place, which would be contrary to the principle prohibiting transboundary
harm on neighbouring states, as reflected in the Trail Smelter Arbitration,
the Corfu Channel case, and Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.1
28
The importance of this case relied on the fact that Hungary, when
facing the risk of damage to the environment, decided to stop the works in
the area. This is more than a preventive measure; for Hungary did not take
some measure to reduce damage but directly eliminated it by not pursuing
further works. The Court accepted that grave and imminent danger to the
environment could constitute a state of necessity, 29 although found that in
this case such danger did not exist.
Another recent and still unsettled case was between Ukraine and
Romania for the Bystroe Canal project. Such project was a Ukrainian plan
to build a canal through the Danube Delta. 130  Despite Romania's
127. Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 2, 241-
242 (Jan. 8, 1996).
128. For text of Hungary's arguments for termination of the Treaty see Treaty Concerning the
Construction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks and Hungarian Termination
of Treaty, Sept. 16, 1977, 32 I.L.M. 1247, 1282,1287 (1993):
[t]he 'provisional solution' violates the principle of the prohibition of
transboundary harm affecting the neighbouring state. This principle was reflected
in the arbitration award of the Trail Smelter arbitration in 1941, in the judgment
of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case in 1949, by
Principle No.21 of the Declaration adopted by the Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment in 1972; by principles No.11 and 21 of the Bnndtland
Report's recommendations on environmental law, Art.294 the Convention on Law
of Sea of 1982, and by Art.2 of the 1991 Convention adopted in Espoo on
environmental impact assessment in a transboundary context.
129. Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 150 (Sept. 25).
130. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Review of the Work Done by the Working Group
on Environmental Impact Assessment and Adoption of Decisions, Findings and Recommendations
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objections, Ukrainian officials maintained that the canal would have no
significant impacts on the delta's delicate ecosystem and commenced
operations in 2004.13 1 Romania made a formal request to the Secretariat
32
of the Espoo Convention.'33 The Commission's unanimous opinion was
that the project was likely to have a significant adverse transboundary
impact on the environment, and Ukraine gave assurances that the entire
Project would be conducted in line with relevant International
obligations. 34 Ukraine was condemned for its action, and at the meeting of
the parties Ukraine was urged to suspend the implementation of the project
and not to implement it.
During Phase II of the project and before fully applying the provisions
of the Convention,' 35  Ukraine committed to reconsider its decision.
Moreover, Ukraine expressed her willingness to enter into negotiations with
Romania and cooperate in the elaboration of bilateral agreements for the
regulation of such project.136 At no moment did Ukraine deny the existence
of a prohibiting rule, she just denied the existence of risk of transboundary
harm, and that the agreement may possibly foresee compensation or
equitable share.
In Navigational Rights (Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua),137 the ICJ,
following the line drawn in Gabcikovo case, acknowledged the importance
of the protection of the environment, as well as the responsibility to protect
it; "Nicaragua also has related responsibilities in respect of.
environmental protection." It therefore concluded that environmental
protection is a legitimate purpose to be fostered by imposing certain
restrictions on Costa Rica's navigational rights, such as to require
Further to a Submission by Romania Regarding Ukraine, M 19-30, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.EA/2008/6
(Feb. 27, 2008).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1.
133. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25,
1991, 1989 U.NT.S. 310 (entered into force Sept. 10, 1997); Espoo Convention, Decision on the
Implementation Committee of Espoo Convention, 3.3, available at http://www.unece.org/env/eia/
documents/implementation Committee/ 2008- 201 1/Report of UkraineDanube-Black%2OSeaOct08_
main.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
134. U.N. Econ, & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Report of the Meeting of the Parties to the
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context on its Fourth Meeting,
4, 15, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.EIA/10 (July 28, 2008).
135. Id. at 74(b).
136. See Press Release, Economic Commission for Europe, Work on the Controversial Bystroe
Canal Project to be Reconsidered (May 23, 2008), http://www.unece.org/press/pr2008/08env_p08e.htm
(last visited on Oct. 1, 2009).
137. Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), 2009 I.C.J. I (Jan. 13).
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passengers to show their identities,'3 8 the requirement of departure
clearance certificates, 139 and the prohibition to navigate during night
hours. 140 However, it rejected environmental concerns as a justification for
prohibiting fishing by inhabitants of Costa Rica for subsistence purposes.'
41
A thorough consideration of the facts of this recent case provides
support for the existence of a prohibition against causing damages to the
environment of other states. Indeed, when Costa Rica challenged the
regulation adopted by Nicaragua, the latter replied that: "the biggest threat
to Nicaragua's reserves comes from the Costa Rican side of the river.
Residents of Costa Rican settlements frequently cross the river, enter the
reserves, cut down protected trees, and return to Costa Rica to sell the
wood.' ' 142 Nicaragua further accused the Costa Rican population of illegal
hunting which endangers biodiversity.
143
In this vein, it has to be noted that Costa Rica denied neither the
existence of the rule, nor Nicaragua's rights to protect its environment;
what Costa Rica questioned was the reasonableness of the measures' 44 and
that the environmental concerns were put forward as an excuse to restrict
Costa Rica's rights, since no damage occurred.
1 41
Thus, the facts of the case show, that Costa Rica, through private
actors who acted independently, caused damage to the environment.
Nicaragua, instead of claiming its responsibility, adopted restrictive
138. Id. at 104.
139. Id. at 109.
140. Jd. at 1127.
141. Id. at 141.
142. Rejoinder of The Republic of Nivaragua, Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v.
Nicar.), 2008 I.C.J. Written Proceedings 1, 4.53 (July 15, 2008).
143. Id. at IN 4.56-4.59.
144. See declaration of Mr. Caflisch at the public hearing held on Mar. 3, 2009: "one really
fails to see what this type of obligation brings in terms of environmental protection or, at least, what is
achieved by them that could not be accomplished by other, less radical measures." Oral Arguments,
Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), 2009 I.C.J. Oral Proceedings 8, 19 (Mar. 3,
2009).
145. See declaration of Mr. Kohen at the public hearing held on Mar. 3, 2009: "U]amais une
seule protestation nicaraguayenne n'a 6t6 imise contre le Costa Rica en raison d'une quelconque atteinte
a l'environnement du fait de sa navigation sur le San Juan." Id. at 35.
[I]maginez-vous les dommages A l'environnement que des canoes et autres
bateaux utilisfs par les Costa-riciens peuvent causer, y compris aux espfces
ichtyologiques. Je dis bien eimaginem, car le Nicaragua n'a 6videmment pas
produit la moindre preuve pour dfmontrer que la navigation costa-ricienne porte
atteinte A l'environnement du fleuve ou qu'elle east memne en mesure de le faire.
Id, at 36.
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regulations. This might be considered much more effective given the
diffuse actions and the insignificance of the harm of each single action but,
which considered cumulatively, might cause irreparable harm. The Court in
this proceeding declared not only that such regulation was legitimate, but
also it suggested that it was Nicaragua's obligation to adopt it in light of its
responsibilities towards the environment.
In Pulp Mills: Argentina vs. Uruguay, Argentina claims that by
authorizing the construction of two pulp mills on the banks of the River
Uruguay, in front the Argentine town of Gualeguaychfi, Uruguay has
incurred international responsibility by reason of its violation of the Statute
of the River Uruguay of February 26, 1975. This also violates other rules
of international law to which this Statute refers and 46 incorporates by
reference some procedural obligations. The substantive obligation argued
to be breached is "Uruguay's obligation not to cause environmental
pollution or consequential economic losses.' ' 147  Even if this claim is
grounded on treaty provisions,148 Argentina contends that the 1975 Statute
incorporated international environmental standards. 149  This would be
tantamount to stating that the treaty was written in accordance to
international rules, and included opinio juris in respect to the customary
rule of not causing pollution.
Uruguay did not challenge the existence of a customary rule of
international law binding upon her and prohibiting her to cause any damage
to the environment of the River Uruguay. On the contrary, her defense was
that the environmental impact assessments undertaken, the regulatory
control and licensing conditions guarantee that no harm would be caused to
the River Uruguay or to Argentina.
50
When resolving the issue, at the provisional measures stage, the Court
seized the opportunity to recall the obligation of states to ensure that
activities within its jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other
146. See Argentina's Application Instituting Proceedings, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Arg. v. Uru.) 2006 I.C.J. Applications 5, 19 (May 4); Statute of the River Uruguay, Dec. 17, 1982, 1295
U.N.T.S. 339.
147. See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Arg. v. Uru.), 2006 I.C.J. Incidental Proceedings 1, 8 (July 13); Statute of the River Uruguay, supra
note 146, at art. 41(a), 42.
148. Statute of the River Uruguay, supra note 146, at art. 42, "[e]ach party shall be liable to the
other for damage inflicted as a result of pollution caused by its own activities or by those carried out in
its territory by individuals or legal entities."
149. J.Vifiuales, The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Development of
International Environmental Law: A Contemporary Assessment, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 232, 254
(2008).
150. Pulp Mills, 2006 1.C.J. Incidential Proceedings at 45,47.
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states. However, it did not find that the construction of the pulp mills
would pose an imminent threat of irreparable damage, in particular, since
the pulp mills were not expected to be operational before August 2007.151
Therefore, many things remain to be seen in the Court's decision, such
as, the existence of damage now that the pulp mills are operational, the
existence of a customary rule on the prohibition of causing damage, and the
customary status of many procedural obligations such as notification and
consent. 152
In the Aerial Incident Case, the dispute concerns Colombia's aerial
spraying of toxic herbicides at locations near and at its border with
Ecuador.1 3 Ecuador alleges that the spraying has already caused serious
damage to people, crops, animals and the natural environment on the
Ecuadorian side of the frontier.
154
Ecuador's substantive claim is that Colombia has violated, "Ecuador's
rights under customary and conventional international law."'155  This is
because fumigations carried across the border or near it have been dispersed
by winds onto Ecuador's territory, and has caused deleterious effects on its
environment. Thus, Ecuador asks the Court to declare that Colombia has
violated its obligations under customary international law by causing or
allowing the deposit on its territory of toxic herbicides. 56 Furthermore,
Ecuador asks the Court to deal with this breach of international law in a
twofold manner: a) by compensation for any loss or damage, including
environmental damage, already caused, and b) by asking the Court to
prohibit the use, by means of aerial dispersion, of such herbicides near any
part of the border between Ecuador and Colombia.'57
This is the typical transboundary environmental damage case, and it is
noteworthy that in the absence of any treaty governing the issue, Ecuador
invokes a customary rule of international law, prohibiting the causing of
damage to support its claim.
Finally, state practice cannot only be found in those cases where some
sort of reparation was claimed or granted as a result of environmental harm;
there are also instances of success where a state refrained from conducting
151. Id. at I 72-73 and 75.
152. The time-limits for the parties to submit their arguments have already been met; therefore,
a decision is expected to be rendered this year.
153. Application, Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.) 2008 I.C.J. 4, T 2 (Mar. 31).
154. Id.
155. Id. at T 37.
156. Id. at T 2, 37.
157. Id. at 38. The case has not been decided yet. The time-limit for Colombia to present its
Counter-Memorial would be 29 March 2010.
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an activity due to environmental concerns. In this vein, France intended to
build a chemical industrial complex, which was likely to produce air
pollution within German territory. Germany objected to the construction
and required the disclosure of information. As a result of the probable
damage, France agreed to abandon the construction of some of the factories
of the complex in order to reduce or eliminate the risk of transboundary
pollution.'58
In 1949, Austria made a formal protest to the Hungarian government
for installing mines in its territory close to the Austrian border. 5 9 Austria
was concerned that during a flood the mines might be washed to its
territory. Indeed, in 1966, a Hungarian mine exploded in Austrian territory
causing damage. Austria protested arguing that Hungary had violated
"uncontested international legal principle according to which measures
taken in the territory of one state must not endanger the lives, health and
property of citizens of another state.' 6 0 Hungary subsequently removed the
minefield.
161
All these cases show that even when states have refused to accept
liability as a legal principle, they acted as though they have accepted it,
normally in the form of a tacit acknowledgment of the obligation. States
did not deny the existence of a legal principle it and proceeded to pay
compensation, regardless of the terms used when paying them, 162 or by
directly refraining from engaging in the questioned activities.
158. Report of the Sixtieth Conference of the International Law Association, Legal Aspects of
the Conservation of the Environment, [1982] 60 INT'L L. ASS'N REP. CoNF. 165 (1982). The ICJ has
stated that the mere fact of abstention, without careful consideration of the motivating factors is not
sufficient to prove the existence of a customary rule see Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266,
286 (Nov. 20); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 77 (Feb.
20). However, it holds equally true that "repeated instances of State practice, when they follow and
promote similar policies may create expectations about the authoritativeness of those police in future
behaviour." Survey of State Liability Regimes, supra 73, at 5. Such conclusion is endorsed by the very
ICJ when it considered a State's abstention as evidence of a customary rule in Nottebohrn (Liech. v.
Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 21 (April 6). In this vein, the abovementioned examples were not isolated acts of
States that abandoned unviable projects. On the contrary, the abstention from continuing with the
projects was the consequence of protests from other States and motivated by core principles of
international environmental law. Thus, still if they are examples of abstentions, they may well help to
show the crystallization of a customary rule of not to cause damage to the environment's of other states.
159. The Secretariat, Survey on Liability Regimes Relevant to the Topic: International Liability
for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 184, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/471 (1995).
160. Id.
161. Survey of State Practice, supra note 34, at 474.
162. Survey of Liability Regimes, supra note 73, at 399.
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IV. THE ROLE OF THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY IN RELATION TO THE
SCHEME OF STRICT RESPONSIBILITY
International liability differs from state responsibility in that the latter
is dependent upon a prior breach of international law, while the former
constitutes an attempt to develop a branch of law in which a state may be
liable internationally with regard to the harmful consequences of an activity
which is not contrary to international law. This innovative approach
received many criticisms, namely that the issue was not whether the
relevant activity was unlawful, but whether the home state fulfilled its due
diligence duty to avoid causing transboundary harm.163  Thus, it was
accused of confusing the lawfulness of the any industrial, explorative or
economic activity with the unlawfulness of the state conduct.' 64  It was
further condemned as utterly unnecessary, since it could be accommodated
in the state responsibility topic and through the development of primary
rules that provided for a strict liability standard.
65
Certainly, if the obligation were to not damage the environment of any
other State, then the mere verification of damage would be a breach of
international law. Thus if damage were produced, a state would incur
international responsibility regardless of whether the activity prompting the
damage was lawful or not.
Owing to the lack of consensus around this new regime of
responsibility, the International Law Commission (ILC) revised its work
and divided it into two different subtopics: Prevention on Transboundary
Damage from Hazardous Activities and International Liability in cases of
loss from Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities. 166 In
2001, the ILC adopted the draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary
Harm from Hazardous Activities.
67
Some authors assert, that by only adopting the Prevention of
Transboundary Harm, the ILC implicitly reaffirmed the due diligence
nature of the obligation to prevent discarding any obligation of not causing
163. See Alan Boyle, State Responsibility and Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 2 (1990).
164. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 50-5 1.
165. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The International Law of State Responsibility: Revolution or
Evolution?, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 105, 109 (1989); Magraw, supra note 7, at 318.
166. G.A. Res. 56/8, 15, U.N. Doc. AIRES/56/82 (Jan. 18, 2002).
167. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session,
[2001] 2(1) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 248, 4, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A./2001. The report was submitted
to the General Assembly, who expressed its appreciation for the valuable work through G.A. Res. 56/82,
prrnbl. % 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/82 (Dec. 12,2001).
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harm, followed by a scheme of strict responsibility.1 68  This conclusion is
misled by the confusion between strict responsibility and liability for a
lawful activity. What the ILC abandoned is the scheme of liability without
a wrongful act due to the conceptual criticism that it received. In no way
does it imply an abandonment of a strict liability regime. Indeed, practice
shows that state responsibility could continue to provide a basis for
preventing environmental harm. 169  Moreover, the ILC has insisted on
repairing environmental damage (ILC articles on allocation of loss in case
of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities) and it is
turning on civil liability as a more feasible regime to gain consensus
between states. 70 This was probably due to the fact that members of the
General Assembly continued to insist that the main raison d'Otre of the
topic assigned for study was liability, and should be completed without
delay.171  This insistence clearly shows that the matter is not definitely
settled in favor of the regime of responsibility for fault, which has been the
traditional one, and it constitutes a demand that rules fitting environmental
concerns ought to be codified.
Moreover, in 2006 the ILC adopted the Draft Principles on the
Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of
Hazardous Activities. 172  Its purpose is to ensure prompt and adequate
compensation to victims of transboundary damage and to preserve and
protect the environment, particularly because "incidents may occur despite
compliance by the relevant State with its obligation concerning
prevention.' 73  Such statement acknowledges that the obligation of
prevention and responsibility for harm are two different concepts; whilst the
obligation to prevent can be well established under international law,
compliance with it may not exonerate a state from its duty to repair should
168. Fitzmaurice, supra note 13, at 1014.
169. Third report, supra note 12, at 27-30.
170. Int'l Law Comm'n [ILC], First Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in Case
of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities, 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/531 (2003)
[hereinafter First Report].
171. G.A. Res. 54/111, f 2-4, U.N. Doc. AIRES/54/1 11 (2000), reiterated in U.N.G.A. Res.
55/152 on Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second session, G.A.
Res. 55/152, prmbl. 7, U.N. Doc.A/RES/55/152 (2001) ("requests the Commission to resume
consideration of the liability aspects of the topic as soon as the second reading of the draft articles on the
prevention of transboundary damage from hazardous activities is completed, bearing in mind the
interrelationship between the prevention and the liability") and also in G.A. Res. 56/82, prmbl. 2-3,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/82 (2002).
172. Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out
of Hazardous Activities, [2006] 2(2)Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 103, U.N. Doc. A/61/10.
173. Id. at prmbl.
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any damage be caused. States are to take all necessary measures to ensure
such compensation is available, without requiring proof of fault. Even if
different measures are suggested, such as imposition of liability on the
operator and the establishment of industry-wide funds, the final
responsibility to ensure that adequate compensation is provided rests with
the state. 74 The adoption of these articles makes the repairing of damage a
paramount consequence of environmental harm regardless of the activity
causing it and whether it was due to lack of diligence when carried out and
constitutes a step towards recognizing the obligation not to damage. Thus,
if these obligations are breached, compensation is justified.
V. AN APPRAISAL OF THE SCHEME OF STRICT RESPONSIBILITY
From a doctrinal perspective, the standard of responsibility to be
applied is not evident, leading to uncertainty when studying the topic.
Uncertainty acts as a barrier to international claims, and renders the
codification ineffective in deterring breaches of obligations.
The traditional scheme of responsibility for fault, with its prevalent
due diligence standard, limits its potential to channel damage costs to the
environment. 175 Moreover, under this scheme, cost would be borne by
innocent states or the global commons, 116 since states can easily avoid
responsibility by referring to compliance with some measures to prevent
damage. Indeed, there is neither a specific definition of what constitutes
due diligence, nor is the state of the art always reflected in the measures that
are required. Therefore, in the absence of clear guidelines against which the
conduct of states is to be assessed, this standard is quite unhelpful since it
offers little guidance on what legislation, controls or measures are required
to prevent pollution. 1
77
Furthermore, another major disadvantage of this scheme is that
proving the lack of diligence is tough and sometimes turns out to be an
insurmountable obstacle. Thus, even if victims were given the opportunity
to have liberal recourse to rules of evidence and inferences, this could be an
unachievable task. Some authors suggest that this regime can work out if
the burden of proof were shifted and the operator or accused state would be
required to prove that he has taken all the care expected. 178 However, as
174. Id. at principle 4.
175. Jutta Brunee, Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International Liability Regimes as
Tools for Environmental Protection, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 351, 354 (2004).
176. NANDA, supra note 8, at 136.
177. BIRNIE &BOYLE, supra note 4, at 113.
178. Brian Jones, Deterring, Compensating, and Remedying Environmental Damage: The
Contribution of Tort Liability, in HARM TO THE ENvIRONMENT: THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND
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previously mentioned, in the absence of high and strict standards, this
obligation can be easily discharged. Therefore, instead of making artificial
or forced modifications to a regime (such as of shifting the burden of proof)
it would be more sensible to directly adopt a regime of strict liability.
In turn, an alternative to the regime of responsibility for fault has been
suggested in the shape of strict liability, but posed upon operators rather
than on the state of origin. Strict liability was held to be the most proper
technique under both common and civil law to enable victims to recover
compensation without having to establish proof of fault on the basis of what
is often detailed technical evidence.
179
However, this regime is not devoid of criticism. It has been qualified
as incapable of providing sufficient incentives to the operator to take stricter
measures of prevention. If the limits are set too low it could even become a
license to pollute or cause injury to others and externalize the real costs of
the operator. 180  It is also felt that it may not be able to meet all the
legitimate demands of innocent victims for reparation due to these limits.
Therefore, for some authors it would be useful to return to actions based on
liability for fault.' 8 ' On the contrary, this article suggests that the
responsibility of states, either direct or residual, should be maintained for
both regimes would be always intertwined.182
In this vein, regimes of international responsibility for breaches of
obligations, either of due diligence or obligations of result, is already
crystallized. That is the very reason for advocating for its applicability; to
take advantage of all the work already taken, instead of proposing a new
different regime. The expectations about its contribution to the
development of international environmental law must not be overestimated;
it is an overarching, reactive, subsidiary regime that will come into play
should all the other rules fail.
What is relevant, as a deterrent and as a certainty element, is the
standard to be applied. Strict liability gives foreseeability to states, as it
plainly determines the expected conduct from states. It also is a deterrent,
THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 1, 22 (Peter Wetterstein ed., Oxford University Press 1997). This author
acknowledges that "the difference between fault-based liability and strict liability may not be as great as
may sometimes be suggested," a conclusion that is verified if the change in the burden of proof was
applied.
179. Elspeth Reid, Liability for Dangerous Activities: A Comparative Analysis, 48 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 731,756 (1999); Survey of Liability Regimes, supra note 73, at 23.
180. First Report, supra note 170, at 119.
181. KiSS & SHELTON, supra note 1, at 375.
182. For a clear explanation of the interaction between the schemes of Civil Liability and State
Responsibility, see T. Gehring & M. Jachtenfuchs, Liability for Transboundary Environmental Damage:
Towards a General Liability Regime?, 4 EuR. J. INT'L L. 92, 104-105 (1993).
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for it would logically constrain states to be more stringent in the design,
implementation and control of their domestic system, as well as, of the
activities taken place within their jurisdictions.
Indeed, three advantages have been proclaimed in defense of strict
liability: firstly, this regime can help internalize costs of pollution into the
polluter's sphere; secondly, it can provide incentives for compliance with
environmental standards; and thirdly it can provide an important back-up
system should environmental harm occur.1
8 3
Such advantages have been questioned by other commentators,
arguing that any cost internalization would be partial at best, due to
difficulties in identifying the polluter, insufficient insurance or insolvent
polluters.' 84 It ought to be noted that it is difficult to identify polluters at
any stage. It is not a problem germane to liability, but to all environmental
regulation, and that is due to the lack of scientific knowledge as to
minimum standards, cumulative effects, the determination of who is the
person causing harm and the apportionment of the contribution of different
actors to degrade the environment. Thus, a typical problem of all
environmental law cannot be raised as an objection only to a strict
responsibility regime.
Another critic, points to the lack of empirical evidence showing the
effect of incentives for compliance. 185 In support of this criticism, a study
commissioned by the European Commission in the context of its work
towards a strict liability directive, is cited to suggest that strict liability
regimes have no statistically significant effect on polluters' behavior.
86
However, what such study concluded was that "the evidence for the effect
of strict liability on air emissions is suggestive but not strongly
significant.'
87
Despite the fact that the study verified a diminution of the levels of
pollution, several observations can be made. First, the calculation of levels
183. Betsy Baker Roben, Civil Liability as a Control Mechanism for Environmental Protection
at the International Level, in INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 821,
827 (Kluwer ed., Kluwer Law Int'l, 2000).
184. Marcel Boyer and Donatella Porrini, The Choice ofInstruments for Environmental Policy:
Liability of Regulation?, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: ISSUES OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 245, 247 (Timothy Swanson ed., JAI Elsevier Science
2002).
185. Brunee, supra note 175, at 366.
186. Id. at 366.
187. David Austin & Anna Alberini, An Analysis of the Preventive Effect of Environmental
Liability: Environmental Liability, Location and Emissions Substitution: Evidence from the Toxic
Release Inventory 26-27, (Oct. 30, 2001), http://e.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/pdf/
preventive final.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2009.
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of pollution based on air emissions within the United States depends on
legislation of different states. The main argument of such study is that
some firms may substitute one means of emission for another, instead of
reducing the actual levels of pollution.'88 Such argument is not applicable
when dealing with states' strict responsibility. Substituting one means for
another will still make a state cause damage to another states' environment,
incurring responsibility all the same. Thus, the state would be more
cautious when evaluating substitutive alternatives. Furthermore, it is
arguably that states will implement clear environmental standards that will
enable themselves to continue with their economic activities in a manner
that it is not prejudicial to the environment. Finally, states will most
effectively control subjects under their jurisdiction, thus, the internalization
of the costs that environmentally-friendly technology might entail will be
mandatory rather than optional. If such technology were not applied the
state would be the one who will bear the costs of the injuries caused with no
benefit. Then, the possibility of suit for liability, instead of adopting new
technology is applicable to individuals, but not to the state. The same
conclusion applies even if a civil liability scheme were adopted with the
residual responsibility of states, for it would be reasonable to presume that
states will diligently control those activities, to avoid incurring
responsibility with no benefit in return.
Finally, it ought to be said that such study might not have been found
so conclusive since, in its aftermath, the European Directive was adopted
with the fundamental aim to hold operators financially liable. Indeed,
according to the European Union Commission "it is expected that this will
result in an increased level of prevention and precaution."' 89 This directive
aims to hold the operator, whose activity has caused the environmental
damage, financially liable "in order to induce operators to adopt measures
and develop practices to minimize the risk."' 90
While a clear-cut obligation of not causing harm and system of strict
liability is not the panacea for environmental problems, it remains a
188. Id. at 4.
189. Memorandum of the European Union Commission, European Union, Questions and
Answers Environmental Liability Directive, (Apr. 27, 2007) (MEMO07/157). With respect to
implementation, interesting observations emerge from Commission Report on Financial Security in
Environmental Liability Directive, 10 (Aug. 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/
liability/pdf/eldreport.pdf (last visited October 2, 2009. This report verified that among the operators
surveyed, none had actually adapted their insurance policy, suggesting that this regime needs to be
communicated to the public to be effective. Id.
190. Directive on Environmental Liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of
environmental damage, Directive Council 2004/35/CE, supra note, 64 of the European Parliament and
of the Council, Official Journal of the European Union, L. 143, p. 56/70, 30/04/04, prmbl, 2.
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necessary step to permit any person to foresee the consequences of lack of
compliance. Indeed, turning back to the cornerstone of this area of
international law, the tribunal of the Trial Smelter Case opined that the
prescribed regime will probably remove the causes of the present
controversy and will probably result in preventing any damage of a material
nature occurring in the future.'
9 1
VI. CONCLUSION
When assessing the regimes to be applied to states' conducts, the
elucidation of the nature and scope of the primary obligation is critical,
since it will determine the governing standard of care, and consequently, the
regime of responsibility. In the realm of environmental harm, the main
obligation is that of not causing damage to other states, and such obligation
can only be fully respected if accompanied by a strict standard of care. This
is not just a proposal; the scheme of strict responsibility for environmental
harm has crystallized into a customary rule.
The "customary law status of a rule depends on whether the principle
is invoked by a majority of states,.. . by a regional group of states or even
by the ... international civil society" and can be proved if referred to in
treaties, soft law instruments, invoked on judicial, or semi-judicial
decisions, or in other expression of state practice.
92
In this vein, the research here exposed shows that the state practice is
consistent; that almost all states when suffering any kind of damage invoke
such rule. That group of states include: the United States, Mexico, Canada,
Japan, Yugoslavia, Australia, New Zealand, Nauru, Hungary, Romania,
Nicaragua, Argentina and Ecuador.
In turn, respondent states to the disputes here reviewed, namely, the
United States, Canada, Austria, Liberia, France, Australia, Ukraine, Costa
Rica, Uruguay, Colombia, have denied the existence of damage, but in no
case did they reject the existence of a prohibition of causing damage to
other states. Moreover, some States, to avoid judicial disputes directly
opted to abandon the project they were pursuing, as were the cases of
France and Hungary amidst others.
With respect to treaty practice, it is quite variable. However, no
negative inference can be drawn from the omission of including a
prohibitive rule, since such omission can have multiple causes. What is
relevant, is the quantity of treaties, and states parties to them, that contain
191. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1980.
192. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Formation of Customary International Law and General Principles,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 449, 451 (Daniel Bodansky,
Jutta Brunnee and Ellen Hey eds., Oxford University Press 2008).
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the obligation to ensure that no damage occurs. There are a myriad of
treaties referring to such obligation. The conspicuous example is the recent
Convention on Biological Diversity, which has 191 parties. Moreover,
practice is also reflected in the celebration of specific treaties regulating
particular situations and clarifying the scope of indemnification to be
provided should any harm arise, as is the case of Norway, the USSR,
Hungary, Canada, the United States of America, Italy, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Liberia, Germany, Austria, Argentina, Uruguay, Finland,
among others.
Turning to opinio juris, it is evident by the adoption of documents by
international organizations, such the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 1629 (XVI) 1961,193 the Resolution on Development and
Environment UNGA 2849 (XXVI) 1972,194 the Resolution on Co-operation
Between States in the Field of the Environment UNGA 2995 (XXII)
1972,195 the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States UNGA 3281
(XXVII) 1974),196 the 1978 United Nations Environment Programme Draft
Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of
States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural
Resources Shared by Two or More States, Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration 1992,197 etc. In particular, it can also be traced in the
declarations of states when voting for those resolutions. For instance, the
Declarations of Canada, the United States and Australia, when adopting
Resolution 2996 (XXVII), and declarations made in particular
circumstances, furnish evidence of the beliefs of states in relation to the
governing obligations. Examples of these governing obligations include
Australia's declaration in the Nuclear Tests Case, the Swedish reservation
of actions in relation to the Chernobyl tragedy, Liberia's and USSR's
declaration within the Trusteeship Council about Nauru, pointing to
Australia's responsibility to restore the damaged area, etc.
The practice cited is wide, representative and most importantly,
includes the majority of the cases that has arisen in the international plane.
In turn, states' declarations have been retrieved from the most democratic
and participative forums under the auspices of the United Nations. Thus,
both elements for the existence of a customary rule are met. Moreover, the
activities of the ILC tend to favor this view since they continue to be
193. G.A. Res. 1629 (XVI), supra note 18, at prmbl.
194, G.A. Res. 2849 (XXVI), supra note 19, at I 4a.
195. G.A. Res. 2995 (XXII), supra note 20, at T 1.
196. G.A. Res. 3281 (XIXX), supra note 25, at prmbl.
197. Drafi Principles on Conduct, supra note 26, at art. 3.
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engaged in the development of some principles to provide the victims with
prompt and adequate remedies.
Finally, from the comparison of the different regimes, strict liability is
the regime that provides certainty to the states, as it sheds light on the
expected conducts. This regime's incentive effects for the adoption of
better technologies to avoid causing harm, its deterrent effect over
deleterious conducts, and the sense of justice that its allocation of loss
brings in, all support the conclusion that this regime is the one that best
serves the environmental concerns of the international community.
